A B S T R A C T This paper analyzes 30-day "treatment spells"-fixed-length periods that commence with a service after a gap in provider contact-to examine how health-care utilization and spending of insured employees at large firms are influenced by health plan types. We focus on differences between preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and two recent innovations: plans that feature a narrow panel of providers, and plans that allow free choice of providers but increase demand-side cost sharing: consumer-driven/high-deductible health plans. Health plan effect estimates change dramatically after controlling for endogenous plan type choice, and individual fixed effects. With these controls, narrow-panel plans reduce the probability of new treatment spells relative to PPOs by 34 percent with little effect on chronic, repeat visit spells. Visit reductions are more concentrated in less severe conditions in narrow-network plans, hence diagnostic coding on the remaining patients increases. We find no evidence that either narrow panel or higher-cost-sharing plans pay lower prices per procedure or have less intensive treatment given initiation of treatment. With controls, consumer-driven/high-deductible health plans are associated with higher total spending on procedures than PPO plans.
I. Introduction
Understanding how to control health-care costs is perhaps the central challenge facing all health-care systems, and hence explaining how health-care costs are influenced by health plan design features is of particular policy interest. In the United States, both public and private insurers are experimenting with diverse new health plan designs, and the new Health Insurance Marketplace established by the Affordable Care Act (ACA) promotes plan design variation on both demand-side cost sharing and supply-side provider networks in the individual and small group markets. Of particular interest are two new health plan types that are growing in market share: (1) plans with narrow panels of providers that rely on careful supply-side selection of providers by health plans, and (2) plans with little or no restrictions on provider choice that rely on high demand-side cost sharing to encourage consumers to shop around for low-cost providers. The broad question this paper Randall P. Ellis (corresponding author, ellisrp@bu.edu) and Wenjia Zhu, Boston University.
1
A popular view in the United States is that competition should be used to control costs. But it remains unclear whether demand-side incentives such as cost sharing that encourage consumers to be cost sensitive are more or less effective at reducing costs than supplyside incentives such as selective provider contracting that relies on competing health plans to find low price, low treatment intensity, or less aggressive providers. Also important is how demand-side cost sharing and supply-side incentives reduce spending.
The general finding in the literature on the demand side is that cost sharing reduces health-care utilization with heterogeneous effects depending on types of services (Duarte 2012) , stages of treatment (Manning et al. 1987) , and one's location in the expenditure distribution (Kowalski 2016) . If consumers are not well informed about their health, demandside cost sharing may motivate consumers to skip important services (Galbraith et al. 2012) . A different concern is that well-informed consumers seeking high-cost services may well reach their deductibles and stop-loss amounts so that demand-side incentives have little influence on the health-care utilization of these people (Kowalski 2016) . On balance, it is the entire cost share structure, not just a single price, that matters in consumers' health-care decisions (Ellis 1986; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2015; Aron-Dine et al. 2015) . The effects of supply-side incentives, in particular narrow provider networks, are less well studied than demand-side incentives. While Gruber and McKnight's (2016) study of narrow provider networks in Massachusetts suggests that cost savings can be significant using a limited network, Peters and Holahan's (2014) study of the ACA Health Insurance Marketplace in six cities reports that narrower provider networks usually but do not always lower premiums. Few previous studies attempt to explain the variations in health spending in a uniform framework where both consumer and provider incentives are considered, with the notable exceptions being Altman, Cutler, and Zeckhauser (2003) and Cutler et al. (2015) .
2 Our paper extends the literature by studying plan type effects on both the consumer and provider incentives in a large, multiple-employer, multiple-insurer panel data set where diverse supply-and demand-side incentives are present.
Ultimately, we are interested in whether and how savings on health-care spending can be achieved by plan designs through their impacts on consumer and provider incentives. Our paper centers around this issue by answering three types of questions. First, we evaluate the overall effect of different health plan types on consumers' incentives to seek care. We then turn to studying what types of care are most affected: are consumers deterred from making initial visits, follow-up visits, or repeated visits over three or more months? The final area we explore is whether and how savings are achieved conditional on consumers deciding to seek care. Are savings achieved via lower prices, lower treatment intensity, or a lower provider effort at identifying diseases to treat (or code) for a given symptom? Section III lays out a conceptual framework underlying our approach.
Three innovations distinguish our conceptual framework from the existing literature. First, we focus on a unit of analysis called treatment spells as an alternative to episode and calendar interval analyses. As discussed in Section II, treatment spells are more attractive for analyzing health-care treatment decisions than annual or monthly periods for clinical and statistical reasons and simpler than episodes. Second, we separately estimate models of subsets of treatment spells, based on whether each spell is a new visit spell (following 30 days with no treatment), a continuation visit spell (following a new spell), or what we call a chronic visit spell (which follows a continuation or previous chronic visit spell), enabling us to distinguish whether plan types are disproportionately affecting new, continuation, or chronic visit spells of treatment. Third, we decompose spending in a spell month into five multiplicative components: the probability of a visit, the level of prices, treatment intensity, an original measure we call coding intensity, and a term capturing patient severity of illness at the time of seeking care. This payment decomposition, discussed in more detail in Section III, enables us to better identify how cost savings are achieved by different health plan types.
We understand that our analysis of only three spell types is highly simplified (although many other studies focus only on total annual spending). A natural extension of our spell approach would be to classify spells more finely, such as by the presence or first onset of a specific disease, the occurrence of certain procedures or events (such as knee transplants, cancer biopsy, or emergency department visits), or to assign spells to a specific provider. We leave these extensions to future papers, focusing on a broad overview here.
Our estimation methods accommodate a number of econometric challenges. All of our models carefully incorporate risk-adjustment measures that use diagnoses, age, and gender to reflect the consumers' information about their health at each stage of the decisionmaking processes: plan choice, the decision to seek care, prices, treatment intensity, and coding intensity. Individual, county, time, and employer fixed effects further control for demand-and supply-side variation so that plan type effects are identified solely by consumers' movement between health plan types within our sample periods. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates are used to control for endogeneity of health plan type choices: plan type dummies are instrumented by fitted probabilities of choosing each plan type that incorporates household variables on employee age and gender, family size, the presence of a baby or spouse, health risk, and the list of plan types offered by the employer in that year. We use two methods to correct standard errors for clustered errors. Our primary approach is to calculate cluster-robust corrected standard error at the level of employer, year, and family versus individual coverage types to avoid overstating model precision. Alternatively, we use bootstrapping methods to reestimate our full models on 100 random samples of our data and generate confidence intervals from the empirical distribution of the estimates. Details about econometric issues are provided in Section IV.
To give a preview, our results in Section VI suggest that narrow-panel health plans do better at reducing costs and utilization than high-cost-sharing plans, relative to preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which are the most widespread health plan type in the United States.
3 Although narrow-panel plans and high-cost-sharing plans appear to save money relative to PPOs when comparing sample means or using simple OLS models, most of these savings disappear once we control for endogenous plan type choice, individual fixed effects, and patient severity of illness. Narrow provider panel plans significantly reduce the probability of new treatment, with little effect on repeat visits for chronic conditions. Decomposition of total spending suggests that none of the plan types is successful at reducing prices relative to PPOs, with some evidence that prices are higher in highdeductible plans. Providers' treatment intensity explains little of the variation in health spending across different plan types. We find more statistically significant differences across plan types in our new measure of coding intensity conditional on a disease than in prices or treatment intensity. In particular, narrow-panel plans code patients more aggressively than high-cost-sharing plans, likely a result of disproportional reduction in less severe spells of treatment in narrow-network plans than in high-deductible plans. Overall, high-cost-sharing plans are found to have higher total spending on procedures once we control for endogenous plan type choice, individual fixed effects, and patient severity of illness. We return to discuss these findings more after presenting our methods, data, and results.
II. Spells of Treatment Approach

A. R A T I O N A L E
While a year is a convenient unit of observation for studying how broad patient characteristics affect spending and utilization, a year is too coarse for examining most consumer and provider decisions: a patient will often see many providers and have multiple spells of treatment in a given year. Keeler and colleagues at the RAND Corporation were the first to provide a careful and comprehensive study of health-care spending and utilization patterns using an episode approach (Keeler et al. 1982; Keeler et al. 1986; Keeler and Rolph 1988) . Episodes of treatment begin with a clinical assessment of a new condition, continue while that condition is being treated, and end once no further visits are observed for a period of time. While attractive conceptually, remarkably few published academic studies have used episodes to study outpatient treatment patterns. 4 This mostly reflects practical issues of distinguishing multiple, overlapping episodes, deciding when information becomes known and when continuation decisions are made, dealing with incomplete episodes at the start and end of the sample period, and incorporating chronic illnesses that may persist indefinitely.
A second and related approach is to use monthly spending and utilization measures. Ellis (1986) and Manning et al. (1987) were early users of this approach, with more recent examples being Eichner (1998) , Einav et al. (2013) , and Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2015) . In order to model the effect of deductibles and stop-losses, which change consumer out-of-pocket costs during the calendar year, all of these studies use a month as the unit of observation, and use variations in health-care cost sharing within a year to study demand effects. Similar to episodes, monthly models are challenged in capturing multiple conditions and dealing with beginning-and end-of-sample truncations. A further weakness of fixed calendar months is that they artificially split up diseases and associated treatment patterns when treatment spans multiple months.
The treatment spell approach used here lies between episodes and monthly analysis, and has its origins in the early work of Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) in modeling demand patterns of mental health treatment. Treatment spells also underlie the Medicare payment system for paying for home health (CMS 2013) and many studies of care following an inpatient admission. Similarly to episodes, a "new visit" spell starts with an office visit or the beginning of a service after a period of time with no visit/treatment, and lasts for a fixed time interval of 30 (or 31) days, with the last day of this period marked as the ending of the treatment spell.
5 This is different from the episode approach, where typically the completion of a treatment marks the ending of an episode. In our framework, following each treatment spell is either a "no visit" spell or another treatment spell. Since treatment spells need not start on the first day of the calendar month, then neither do "no visit" spells: if no visit/treatment is observed within a 30-day period, then we have "no visit" spell(s) until the presence of a new visit that marks the beginning of a new treatment spell. The treatment spell approach facilitates modeling decisions of the initialization and 4 For discussion of this issue, see MaCurdy et al. (2008) and Rosen et al. (2012) . Both papers apply two most commercially available episode groupers, Episode Treatment Groups (ETGs) and Medical Episode Groups (MEGs), to form episodes from claims and assign costs to episode. MaCurdy et al. (2008) focus on using Medicare claims as inputs, while Rosen et al. (2012) use commercial claims data. Both discuss challenges associated with matching and comparing results from different groupers. 5 We alternate between assigning each treatment spell month 30 or 31 days, and assigning spell month 12, 30, or 31 days according to whether it is a leap year.
F I G U R E 1 . Example of Treatment Spell Assignment
continuation of health-care treatment over fixed 30-day periods that is missed by using fixed monthly periods, while also allowing multiple decision points that are often missed when creating episodes.
6
Unlike Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) and most episode groupers, we do not attempt to uniquely assign utilization and spending variables to distinct illnesses, but instead view treatment as generally related to many conditions. For example, we do not classify a treatment spell as a diabetic, hypertensive, or mental health spell, but instead use a riskadjustment framework to capture any number of conditions within the spell. 7 For this paper, we do, however, distinguish between three categories of treatment spells (Figure 1) . Following a period of at least 30 days with no visits, we have "new visit" spells, which may or may not be followed by a "continuation visit" spell. If a "continuation visit" spell is followed by a third (or more) spell of treatment, we classify such spells as "chronic visit" spells. Fitting around our fixed-length treatment spells are "no visit" spells of variable length, which are simple to model since by construction there are no visits or spending in them. Figure 1 illustrates how office visits (denoted as "V"), hospital stays (denoted as "H"), and 6 Consider a hypothetical patient who receives a colonoscopy that identifies a polyp in the colon that is found to be malignant in mid-November. The patient ultimately undergoes 120 days of radiation and chemotherapy treatment. Using an annual observation, this episode of treatment would be divided up into two years, both of which would be lower cost than if the cancer had been identified in July. Using a fixed calendar month unit of observation, this patient would have half a month of initial cancer treatment and three and a half further months of high costs and utilization. Using an episode approach, all of the four months of treatment decisions would be collapsed into a single episode observation, as if there was only one treatment decision made by patients and doctors. Finally, in a spell of treatment approach, one would look at resource use in the first 30 days of new treatment and in the second, third, and fourth continuation months of treatment. If one believes that new information is obtained during an episode or year and that new decisions are made based on that information, then spells of treatment may be more useful than fixed time periods or episodes. 7 A treatment spell approach can be easily extended to keep track of treatment patterns associated with specific conditions or illnesses, the use of specific services or drugs, or other triggering events. We use the onset of treatment after at least 30 days with no visits as our triggering event.
F I G U R E 2 . Frequency of total health spending of spells following no visit for three time periods emergency department visits (denoted as "ER") by one person can be grouped into new, continuation, and chronic spells of treatment, as well as into "no visit" spells that lie in between them.
B. W H Y A R E S P E L L S B E T T E R ?
We employ a treatment spell approach for both clinical and statistical reasons. The main argument in favor of treatment spells over months and quarters is clinical validity. On the one hand, fixed monthly calendar intervals inherently split many spells of treatment across multiple periods, and do not usually correspond to clinical decision-making units. For example, follow-up visits at 7, 14, and 28 days are common, and will all tend to belong to a single treatment spell month, but they do not necessarily fit into a single calendar month. On the other hand, longer periods such as a calendar year or quarter, while easier to model than months and less likely to split up treatment decisions, aggregate new information and diverse decisions into a single unit. The second argument in favor of treatment spells is statistical. To explore this, we plot the distributions of health spending under three time periods (calendar year, calendar month, and spell month) in Figure 2 , with summary statistics shown in the box. Each point in the figure is the percentage of total observations that falls into each of the fixed-dollar windows ($50 in our experiment) along the distribution. We drop observations with negative payments and focus on "new visit" spells, namely spells following a period of at least 30 days with no visits. We report both the natural and the top-coded spending at $250,000 annually and $50,000 monthly, both values of which correspond to the 99.99th percentiles of spending. Figure 2 shows that spending is less dispersed at the treatment spell than at the calendar month level, and the variation in spending at the spell month level is closer to that under the annual framework when spending is top coded (the last row in the box).
III. Conceptual Framework
Each year an employer chooses a set of health plans offered to employees. Employees in turn choose from among the available health plans, with choices reflecting plan characteristics, employee demographics, employer, and household health status. We assume that choice of health plans is determined at the beginning of each year, and is fixed throughout the year. The analysis of plan choice and plan types presented here is best understood in the context of the evolution of health plan types in the United States. Fifty years ago, almost all large firms offered a single health plan, which in today's terminology would be comprehensive plans (abbreviated here as COMPs), with modest cost sharing, no restrictions on provider choice, and little effort to manage care. The first major plan type innovations were health maintenance organizations (HMOs), which contracted with a limited set of providers, negotiated reduced fees, and typically "managed care" in the sense that providers often would have the plan or its agents oversee the services provided. In the 1990s, there was a backlash against HMOs' form of managed care, despite the evidence that HMOs are successful at reducing costs (Dugan 2015; Newhouse and McGuire 2014) .
The next popular plan type to emerge was preferred provider organizations (PPOs), which negotiated reduced fees and typically included a somewhat limited set of providers but with less tight management. PPOs range widely in their cost-sharing features, and are now the most popular plan type among large employers. In order to motivate enrollees to use higher-quality or lower-price providers, point-of-service plans (POS) emerged in the 1990s that introduced the concept of tiers of providers, with some "in-network" providers given lower consumer cost shares than out-of-network providers, with the latter still eligible for some coverage.
10 These four plan types-COMP, HMO, PPO, and POS plans-represented more than 99 percent of all health plan enrollments in large employers 9 Among the 7 percent of our employees who switch plan types each year in our continuously eligible sample, over 90 percent of the switches happened on January 1. Switches can occur because of births, marriage, divorces, sabbaticals, or moving, and need not mean that the plan year differed from the calendar year. We did not find any plans where the majority of switches occurred at a month other than January. 10 Some HMOs, PPOs, and POS plans pay some providers using capitation (monthly payments) rather than fee-for-service reimbursement. These types of payments also dominate spells of treatment in a "point of service with capitation" plan type. Altogether, spell months involving capitation payments amount to about in 2004 when other, newer plan types began to emerge (Ash and Ellis 2012, Online Appendix Table A3 ; the Appendix is available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi /suppl/10.1162/AJHE a 00056).
Since 2004, two new plan types have become popular. One plan type is exclusive provider organizations (EPOs) that greatly restrict consumer choice of providers while deemphasizing demand-side cost sharing. It is subjective where the boundary is between EPOs and HMOs: we rely on our data vendor's assessment of this distinction (Truven Health Analytics). Some EPOs are as narrow as the providers employed at a single hospital or medical school, while others are statewide networks of carefully chosen providers. The second new plan type is consumer-driven/high-deductible health plans (CDHDs) that promote wider consumer choice but raise consumer cost sharing.
11 As with EPOs, there are subjective boundary issues between PPOs and CDHD plans, but we rely on the classification system of the data vendor to identify plan types in our analysis (see more discussion of our data source in Section IV.A and Online Appendix B).
Our study focuses on spending and utilization differences among six plan types. These include four traditional plan types-COMP, PPOs, HMOs, and POS-which still represent the majority of all the health plan enrollment in the United States. We use the PPO plan as the comparison group since it has the largest number of enrollees and is the most commonly offered plan type. The two new plan types of great interest are CDHDs, which we classify as the increased demand-side cost-sharing plan, and EPOs that rely primarily on supply-side choices made by health plans. Table 1 provides details about each plan type, sorting plan types according to their extent of consumer choice of providers. The last column of this table shows the average cost sharing of different plan types in the analysis sample (see more details about sample creation in Section V.A and Online Appendix B). We find that the empirical cost sharing is consistent with the general perception of these plan types. We also find that higher-cost-sharing plan types are in general less restrictive on choice of provider panels, which highlights the trade-off that dominates most US health plans. Figure 3 summarizes enrollment trends in the six plan types being studied here.
B. D E C O M P O S I T I O N O F H E A L T H -C A R E S P E N D I N G
We decompose total spending on each monthly spell of treatment into five components in order to understand the underlying factors that contribute to plan type variation in spending. Using total spending during a spell month as our measure (which includes both consumer paid and plan paid spending), we use the following equation in which the T A B L E 1 . Health plan type definitions and degrees of cost sharing and provider network generosity Cost share in the last column is the authors' calculation using the core analysis sample (N = 108,896,981) detailed in Section V.A and Online Appendix B. The measure captures the amount of total payments paid by consumers. It is calculated by taking the ratio of patient out-of-pocket payments (i.e., sum of copay, coinsurance, and deductible payments) to total spending that includes both patient out-of-pocket spending and plan payments.
variables i, j, s, and t index patient, provider, service, and spell month, respectively.
Expected total health spending of patient i with provider j in treatment spell t, Y i jt
.
F I G U R E 3 . Market shares of six health plan types in the analysis sample
Notes: Market shares are calculated at the patient level. Plan acronyms are defined in Table 1 .
Equation 1 is an identity and each component in brackets can be calculated empirically. The first term in brackets is the visit decision, which is the probability of starting or continuing a spell of treatment in a given month, and thereby incurring positive spending. The second term is a conventional price index with weights being the spell's actual quantities, using the provider's actual prices in the numerator and national average prices in the denominator. Both provider actual prices and national average prices are adjusted to account for inflation and geographic variation in provider costs. The third term is a measure of treatment intensity. The numerator uses national average prices of each service to weight actual quantities provided during the spell. The denominator f (H i j.t ), is a measure of predicted spending given the diseases concurrently assigned by the patient i's own provider j for that month of treatment t. Overall this third expression reflects the amount of services provided to patient i during the spell given condition diagnosed by provider j in that spell. Intuitively, this term is the quantity of services, as measured using the national procedure price average, relative to how sick the patients are as measured by coding by providers for that spell of treatment, which we discuss further below. The fourth term in brackets is our measure of coding intensity. It is the ratio of two risk-adjustment predictions. The numerator of this term, matching the preceding denominator, is the expected cost given the provider's own concurrently assigned diagnoses during the current spell month of treatment. The denominator, as well as the final term in brackets, g (H i..t−1, ), is a different measure of expected spending, capturing the consumer's expected spending (or patient severity) at the time of making the decision to seek treatment. At a minimum, it should include the diseases known to the consumer from the prior 12 months, but the consumer may also know something about the nature of their current spell (e.g., an injured shoulder, sore throat, feeling of sadness). We interpret the fourth term in brackets as a measure of coding severity in that the broad body system used in the final severity adjustment (skin problem, heart problem, mental health disorder, etc.) is something mostly observable by the patient at the time that a visit is initialized, while the detailed diagnoses of this condition is something that requires a clinician. 12 We posit that this measure partly captures how much effort providers put into identifying and writing down more detailed, specific diagnoses, a decision that is potentially influenced by the health plan type. The fifth term in brackets is a conventional risk score measure of patient severity, using lagged information and coarse information about conditions diagnosed during the current spell month.
All five components in our decomposition 1 are potentially subject to demand-and supply-side incentives induced by plan design features. The final term-severity-has been included in the decomposition to form an identity, so part of its association with either consumer or provider incentives will be captured in the coding intensity measure. If severity varies by plan type, it is a signal of adverse selection. Below we discuss further the hypothesized health plan type effects on probability of visits (Section III.D), prices, treatment, and coding intensities (Section III.F).
C. S U B S E T S O F T R E A T M E N T S P E L L S E X A M I N E D
We use our treatment spell modeling approach to examine the overall probability of a visit and then distinguish between different spell types. Using N, V, and C to denote no visit, new visit, and continuation spells, we model the probability of a visit conditional on the previous spell month information, namely the three probabilities Pr(V|N −1 ), Pr(C|V −1 ), and Pr(C|C −1 ), where the negative one denotes the treatment spell of the consumer in the prior spell month. (Online Appendix Table A1 describes the spell transition matrix underling this approach.)
D. H E A L T H P L A N T Y P E S A N D I N C E N T I V E S T O S E E K C A R E
It is theoretically ambiguous whether demand-side cost sharing that encourages consumers to be cost sensitive is more or less effective at reducing care seeking than supplyside incentives such as selective provider contracting. On the one hand, higher cost sharing reduces a consumer's incentive to initiate treatment while having little influence on the incentive to supply care provided that payments to providers remain stable. Since new treatment spells are mostly initiated by consumers, while continuation visits are more likely to be initiated by provider recommendations, we would expect demand-side cost sharing to have a greater impact on new than on continuation spells. On the other hand, supplyside incentives may potentially have a greater impact than demand-side incentives on consumers' care-seeking behaviors. It is possible that narrow provider panels make new care seeking less attractive: consumers in supply-side constrained plans, such as HMOs and EPOs, may internalize the less aggressive disease identification and treatment, and may be less inclined to seek care than consumers in plans less constrained on provider networks. It is also possible that a narrow network creates an expectation of higher effort by health plans to choose high-quality, low-cost providers to manage care, generating a greater incentive for consumers to seek care.
E. C O D I N G I N T E N S I T Y
Coding intensity variation and strategic diagnostic coding have recently received considerable attention, perhaps because of the increased use of risk adjustment in the ACA. Wennberg et al. (2013 Wennberg et al. ( , 2014 have challenged the Medicare risk-adjustment formula by arguing that the Medicare formula unduly reflects variation in coding intensity as well as variation in severity (for a contrary view, see Newhouse et al. 2013 ). Geruso and Layton (2015) find evidence of statistically significant coding intensity increases on the order of 7 percent in response to risk-adjusted payments in private Medicare Advantage plans. Further evidence of strategic coding is provided by Kronick and Welch (2014) . To explore this issue, we develop a novel method for calculating coding intensity and use it to examine whether coding intensity appears to be responsive to plan types within our sample.
The rationale for our coding intensity measure is as follows. For most health conditions, the consumer will know what broad body system is ill even before seeing a doctor, and hence a relatively crude diagnosis classification system captures reasonably well the consumer's information at the time that care is sought. In contrast, only a physician can distinguish among the thousands of more specific diagnoses, particularly those associated with the highest cost and greatest severity. We therefore decompose the conventional risk score measure of health status into two components. The first component predicts healthcare spending using only broad categories of health conditions, while the second model uses more refined diagnostic categories concurrently assigned by providers in the current spell month of treatment. Both are calibrated to have means equal to the overall average spending, but the ratio of the second to the first measure is an indication of whether the physician spent extra time noting the specific, more refined diagnoses among the broad categories. We use this ratio as a measure of coding intensity.
F. H Y P O T H E S I Z E D H E A L T H P L A N T Y P E E F F E C T S O N C O M P O N E N T S O F S P E N D I N G
First of all, we expect an incentive to upcode diagnoses under a narrow network of providers if the goal is to control costs. It is possible that providers upcode conditions to make patients look sicker in order to justify (or protect themselves against) high costs. Besides providers' upcoding incentives, variations in coding intensity across plan types can also arise from mechanical reasons. For example, if narrow networks or cost sharing primarily reduces provider contacts of less severe conditions, then average coding intensity would increase for the remaining patients. Given diagnoses, providers in a managed care with narrow networks will have incentives to treat patients less aggressively than if they were in a plan with less of a need to manage care. Otherwise costs will look higher with more treatment done on patients. However, these plans may also put a lot of emphasis on prevention, which can involve more regular contact with patients.
Finally, although higher cost sharing should tend to encourage consumers to shop around for lower-cost providers, it also reduces the incentive for health plans to negotiate reduced prices. The impact of narrow networks on prices is also unclear. On the one hand, plans with narrow networks have more power to negotiate reduced prices from providers. On the other hand, narrow-network plans give consumers less ability to shop around and may reduce provider-level competition to attract patients through lower prices. We construct a sample of 5.1 million commercially insured adults continuously eligible for five years, and use this sample of over 300 million treatment spells to calibrate various risk-adjustment models. We use a smaller subset for our core analysis containing 2.5 million individuals with over 100 million treatment spells for which we can assign an employer, and a plan type. (More details about file construction are provided in Section V.A and in Online Appendix B.)
IV. Data and Empirical Strategies
B. E M P I R I C A L S P E C I F I C A T I O N b.. health plan choice. It is well understood that health plan choices are endogenous, and reflect expected health-care spending (Meer and Rosen 2004; Busch and Duchovny 2005; Deb and Trivedi 2006) . Estimates of response to insurance plans that do not control for this endogeneity can be seriously biased. We control for this endogeneity by using a 2SLS estimation in which plan types are instrumented by the fitted values from multinomial logit models that predict probabilities of selecting a given plan in a given year. We estimate plan choice at the contract (i.e., household) level rather than at the individual level, since large employers generally require all members of a household to be in the same health plan (Eichner 1998) .
Specifically, as shown in equation 2, a household h's choice of plan p depends on whether the head-of-household's employer offers the plan in year t, health status, and demographic information about the household. Without the precise plan identifiers being available, we focus our analysis on the choice of plan types rather than the choice of specific plans.
13 Unless otherwise noted, hereafter health plans in this paper denote plan types. Since we do not have plan-specific premiums, benefits, or coverage features, we capture 13 We acknowledge that our approach abstracts from any within plan type variation that may also be significant. Dranove (2000) studies distinct physician contractual arrangement between different HMOs for their cost containment. Without details on plan benefit design, we are unable to address this variation, but focus instead on the impact of two new relatively distinct plan types: EPOs and CDHDs. Although not these plan features with a plan-specific dummy for each plan type offered by each employer in each year with or without family coverage. We then estimate household choice of health plans by applying a multinomial logit model separately for each employer-yearfamily coverage type combination. Employees with only one insured enrollee were modeled as single plans, and those with multiple enrollees were modeled as family plans. Fitted plan type choices for the household are then used as instruments for each individual in the household in our 2SLS models of subsequent treatment decisions.
For a specific employer in year t who offers family or single coverage plan(s), (Glied 2000) . 14 We controlled for number of family members, but children's illness was not captured in the model of household choice of health plans. If we were redoing the plan choice analysis, we would include children in the sample. Note that we model plan choice here solely to obtain fitted probabilities to use as instruments. For instruments we only need exogeneity and correlation with actual plan choices, not unbiased estimates of demand functions. 15 We used diagnoses for a calendar year in our model of plan choice despite the fact that most employers require employees to choose their health plan in November or December, not on January 1. If we were redoing the plan choice analysis, using diagnoses as of the end of November would be a better choice. Our instrument is still valid in that the diagnoses used are all from the previous year and do not include diagnoses coded during the treatment spell month being predicted. 16 We top coded the risk score at the 95th percentile (RRS = 4.824) to reduce the influence of extremely high-risk-score individuals in predicting health plan choice, hypothesizing that changes in risk score differences above this level (predicting household spending over $20,000 per year) do not differentiate plan choices well. The top-coded risk scores were consistently superior to the un-top-coded scores in predicting plan choices.
the individual level, can be written in the following linear specification:
In this model, the dependent variable, Y i pct , is the dependent variable for consumer i with plan type p in county c in spell month t. Four alternative dependent variables denote each of the four measures from our decomposition in equation 1. 17 Five plan dummies, PLAN p , are included, one for each plan type {EPO, HMO, POS, COMP, CDHD}, which we instrument by the array of fitted probabilities of each plan type choice from the first stage as discussed in the previous section. The omitted plan type is PPO, and hence the estimated coefficients α give the plan type effects as a difference from PPOs. We control for a measure that captures the enrollee's health status, X i,t−1, enrollee fixed effects, μ i , employee county fixed effects, γ c , and spell month fixed effects δ t . The random error term ε i pct captures unobserved terms. We discuss the need to control for cluster correlations of errors in Section IV.C.
The specification for each model that uses one of the four measures as the dependent variable is the same, with the exception of the risk-adjustment variable used as a control variable included in X i,t−1 . For modeling the probability of a visit, we use a prospective model risk score predicting total spending estimated from the prior 12 months of diagnoses to capture the patient's overall health status. Here we only use preexisting diagnoses since there is no possibility of observing any diagnoses in the absence of a visit. For all of the other models we use a risk-adjustment relative risk score that captures patient severity at the time of seeking treatment.
18 Fundamentally, the measure is a monthly expected spending based on a coarse category of diseases from the prior 12 spell months and the current month of treatment.
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Employers do not randomly decide on which health plans to offer. Instead, choices of plan offerings may reflect the preferences of their employees. Bundorf (2002) examined this employer choice of plans to offer and its relationship with employee characteristics, and found it to be quantitatively small. Still, it seems plausible that firms with healthier and higher-income enrollees are more likely to innovate and offer EPOs and CDHDs than firms with sicker or lower-income employees. To deal with this concern, we include employer-year-family coverage fixed effects, λ E Y F , in our 2SLS models to absorb the underlying employer characteristics that may make them more or less likely to offer innovative plan types.
These employer fixed effects, together with the estimation of multinomial logit models separately for each employer, also absorb differences due to plan type-specific premiums, cost sharing, and other plan features. Our fitted probabilities and hence health plan type choice instruments capture why individual i 1 in household h 1 is more or less likely than individual i 2 in household h 2 to be in plan type p at employer E in year Y in family 17 The last term of our decomposition is included to form an identity and is not modeled here. 18 All risk scores and condition categories were generated using Verisk Health/DxCG Risk Solutions Version 4.21 software. 19 For details about the different risk-adjustment measures used, see Online Appendix B2. coverage type F. Our analysis relies on household-level variation in choices made, not employer variation in plan types offered or their premiums and benefits. We identify the effects of plan innovations by the change in coverage for continuously eligible households. Individuals who do not change plan types in our sample are uninformative about the effects of plan type on decisions.
c. clustered standard errors. Although we include employer-year-family coverage fixed effects in our 2SLS models to account for the fact that the underlying employer characteristics may make them more or less likely to offer each plan type, these fixed effects do not control for all the within-cluster correlation of the errors, since individuals are likely to have similar risk factors (and thus spending) within each employeryear-family coverage cell ("cluster"). Estimation without further correction will generally underestimate the variance estimates (Cameron and Miller 2015) . 20 We use two approaches to correct standard errors for this clustering. Our primary method is to use the cluster-robust variance estimate of Cameron and Miller (2015) to correct standard errors and avoid this bias. 21 Our second approach is to use bootstrap estimation of standard errors in 100 random samples of our data, with random draws done at the employeryear-family coverage type level. Details about our bootstrapping method are provided in Section VI.C and Online Appendix C.
V. Sample and Descriptive Analysis
A. F I L E C R E A T I O N
We started by collapsing inpatient and outpatient service claims into spells of treatment. We excluded pharmacy claims in the analysis to simplify our analysis. Diagnoses and spending are assigned to spell months based on the "from date" of service for each procedure, not using through (or ending) dates of service (as is done with Medicare Advantage risk adjustment), and not assigning services to the beginning of an episode, as was done by Keeler, Manning, and Wells (1988) , or the date of discharge (as is implicitly done by DRGs). Since most claims for procedures are for a single service date, we feel that the service date best reflects the timing when a patient and doctor are likely to know of an illness or condition.
The next task was to assign the key explanatory variables. A significant challenge was dealing with missing values on key variables, namely employer, health plan IDs, and 20 Cameron and Miller (2015) show that the cluster-robust variance is bigger when (1) regressors within the cluster are correlated, (2) errors within the cluster are correlated, (3) the within-cluster regressor and the error correlations are of the same sign, and (4) the cluster sizes are large. 21 We estimate all results using the three-step estimation algorithm of Brachet (2007) to compute clusterrobust standard errors using two-stage least squares, modified to accommodate the very large number of fixed effects. Luo, Zhu, and Ellis (2016) propose an iterative approach in which multiple high-dimensional fixed effects are absorbed sequentially and the process is repeated until convergence, which is shown to be more efficient than our current algorithm. We tested our main model on a 20 percent random sample of our analysis data using this approach and found that results based on 100 iterations were very similar to those without iterations.
provider county (used for deflating prices with county deflators). For missing employer information, we assigned consumers to the same employer as observed during a previous or subsequent year since the only reason they are in the database is because they are with a particular employer. For providers with a missing provider county, we use the provider's state rather than the provider's county. More details on file creation and dealing with missing information are provided in Online Appendix B.
B. S U M M A R Y S T A T I S T I C S
There have been sharp changes in enrollments in different health plan types even over the four years being studied here (Figure 3 Table 2 provides summary statistics on the analysis sample and by plan type. This table shows the rich set of plan types offered by the 66 employers in our analysis sample. HMOs and PPOs remain the two most common plan types, together accounting for more than 77 percent of the person spell months in our sample. 22 Enrollee age, relative risk score (RRS), and monthly spending all signal significant risk differences across plan types. COMPs have an average age that is six years older than EPOs, which have the youngest adult enrollees.
23 Figure 4 provides an alternative way to understand the risk differences across plan types. For each plan type, we standardize the average RRS, probability of any visit, and the total and procedure payments using each of their corresponding means across all plan types (normalized to 1 shown as the vertical line in the graph) as the benchmark. We see that COMPs have the highest average risk along all the four dimensions, while HMOs have the healthiest adult enrollees. EPOs, HMOs, POS, and CDHDs have below-average risk scores, suggesting that individuals in these plans are healthier than average given their ages. These are consistent with the findings in the literature that health plans with restrictive choice of providers enjoy favorable selection (Hellinger 1995; Mello et al. 2003; Landon et al. 2012; Bajari et al. 2014) . Similar to previous studies, Table 2 and Figure 4 show that narrow-network plans tend to enroll younger, healthier people who consume lower levels of health resources. Note that here we only show simple summary statistics of individual spells in our analysis sample. We do not distinguish ex ante selection bias (Hellinger 1995; Bajari et al. 2014 ) from post-enrollment differences in health-care 22 Among the total of 66 employers and 255 employer years in our sample, 7 employers offered EPOs and there are altogether 15 employer years in which EPOs were offered in our sample. The corresponding numbers are 37 and 119 for CDHD plans. 23 A comparison of key statistics on the full sample with the sample used for our core analyses is shown in the Online Appendix Table A2. The two samples share similar distributions of age and gender. Enrollees in the analysis sample are somewhat healthier than the original sample, which is a consequence of dropping spells associated with pregnancy claims and capitated payments (mostly PPO and POS plans) and excluding enrollees without any identified employers.
T A B L E 2 .
Descriptive statistics on analysis sample 2007-11, aged 21-64 , having at least one month of plan type information available during at least one month each year, and to whom we assign an employer (employers). The analysis sample drops 2007 data because they are used to predict risk scores using diagnoses and/or demographics in the prior 12 months. Sample size is 108,896,981 person spell months. Relative risk scores are calculated by prospective risk-adjustment models predicting health-care spending for 12 months (top coded at $250,000) prior to the current month. Any visit indicator equals one if total spending in a spell month is positive. Both total and procedure payments are top coded at $50,000 per spell month. Refer to Online Appendix B for details on sample creation.
F I G U R E 4 . Comparison of four standardized measures by plan type
Notes: For each plan type, the sample mean was divided by the overall sample mean in order to express it as a standardized measure, which by construction has a grand mean of one. Relative risk scores are the prospective un-recalibrated DxCG risk scores predicting total health-care spending in one month using only information from the prior 12 months (top coded at $250,000). Plan acronyms are defined in Table 1. utilization (Landon et al. 2012; Bajari et al. 2014) . Neither do we distinguish among the types of enrollees-such as those switching in versus those switching out of a given plan type (Hellinger 1995) . 24 Strikingly, although EPO plans have the healthiest group of adults, people in these plans on average are associated with more provider contacts and higher spending than the relatively sicker people in POS or CDHD plans. Also notice that the two standardized measures of real spending-total and procedure spending-are highly correlated in that plans with relatively higher spending on all services are also those with higher procedure expenditures, and vice versa.
VI. Results
A. H O U S E H O L D P L A N C H O I C E A N D F I R S T -S T A G E R E G R E S S I O N R E S U L T S
Altogether, 510 separate logit models were estimated of household choice of health plan types from among the plan types offered by their employer in a given year for a household's T A B L E 3 . 2SLS results showing health plan effects on probability of seeking unconditional visits and three types of conditional visits Results show the effects of health plan on probability of seeking any care and conditional on three previous spell types. All regressions control for employer-year-family coverage dummies, spell month time dummies, a prospective model risk score predicting total spending using the prior 12 spell months of diagnoses, and employee county and individual fixed effects. Column 1 shows the probability of any visit regardless of the type of visit in prior month. Column 2 corresponds to the probability of a new visit conditional on no visit in the previous month ("new visit" spells). Column 3 is the probability of a continuing visit conditional on a new visit in the previous month ("continuation visit" spells). Column 4 denotes the probability of a continuing visit conditional on a previous continuation spell month of visit ("chronic visit" spells). Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the employer-year-family coverage level using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section IV of the text. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.10.
family or individual class. Given the number of different choice models estimated and parameters involved, we do not present any results from this plan choice analysis here. Our purpose is to use the health plan type probabilities calculated from the plan choice models as instruments for the actual plan type choices in the 2SLS models of plan type effects on health-care utilization and spending. F-tests on first-stage regressions of actual plan type choices on these predicted probabilities show that the fitted probabilities are extremely strong instruments. Table 3 shows 2SLS regression results from linear probability models of the probability of any visit, and the probabilities of three types of spells: new visits, continuation visits, and 25 See Online Appendix Tables A6 and A7 for details on the first-stage regression results. chronic (repeated) visits. 26 The table shows that HMOs and POS plans reduce the overall number of visits relative to PPOs, and COMP plans increase them significantly. Looking across the three visit types, we see that the effects of plan types show up mostly in new visits for EPOs, POS, and COMP plans, while HMOs mainly affect continuation visits. None of the plan types differ statistically from PPOs in influencing decisions to seek chronic visits. Results on EPO and POS plans suggest adverse selection in response to narrow provider networks since less severely ill patients are more likely to have reduced their visits.
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B. P L A N T Y P E E F F E C T O N V I S I T D E C I S I O N S
For the two new plan types of greatest interest here, we see that EPOs appear to reduce visits (results are of borderline statistical significance though), particularly new visits. Also, once we control for individual characteristics using risk adjustment and individual fixed effects, we cannot reject that CDHD plans have no effect on visits relative to PPOs.
C. P L A N T Y P E E F F E C T O N ( T O T A L A N D D E C O M P O S E D ) H E A L T H -C A R E S P E N D I N G
We now examine how health plan types are associated with levels of health-care spending and three intensity measures conditional on a patient deciding to make a visit.
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The 2SLS results are shown in Table 4 . 28 All regressions control for risk adjustment, spell time dummies, employer-year-family coverage fixed effects, and employee county and individual fixed effects. 29 Results show that conditional on a visit, HMOs and COMPs are more expensive than PPOs. Neither EPOs nor CDHD plans are statistically significantly different from PPOs. The point estimate on CDHD plans is positive and suggests that costs are 12.2 percent higher than PPOs after controls, although not quite statistically significant (p = 0.101).
The decomposed regression results show that none of the plans particularly promote using lower-price providers relative to PPOs. HMOs on average have 4.9 percent 26 OLS results in Online Appendix Table A3 show that compared with PPOs, all other plans tend to discourage patients from making visits, regardless of whether these other plans feature a relatively higher cost sharing (like CDHDs) or more restrictive provider networks (like EPOs and HMOs) or even higher generosity (like COMPs). 27 Our spending includes both patient out-of-pocket spending and plan payments. Although we estimated models of both total spending and spending on procedures, we prefer and focus our attention on the latter because facility payments are much harder to price and to predict, particularly when trying to calculate a national average price to use for generating normalized prices. Further justifications for using procedure payments can be found in Online Appendix B1. 28 In an earlier version of this paper, we included provider fixed effects in our model, which we now drop here. We made this change because (1) provider IDs are subject to serious missing values, forcing us to drop a sizable fraction of our sample, and (2) there is reason to believe that the provider fixed effects may absorb some of the impact of plan incentives: one impact of changing plans and responding to higher cost sharing or restricted provider choice could be to switch to a lower-cost provider. 29 For comparison, results with only employee county fixed effects or individual fixed effects are shown in Online Appendix Table A4 . We see that regressions with and without individual effects give very different predictions about plan type effects on the spending and intensity measures. Once individual fixed effects are controlled for, geographic variation does not explain much of the plan type effects on the total and decomposed procedure-related payments. County fixed effects X X X X Individual fixed effects X X X X Notes: Table shows the two-stage least squares regression results of health plan effects on payment and intensity measures on individual spells in which payments for procedures are positive. All models control for employer-year-family coverage dummies, spell month time dummies, and a patient severity measure that is a monthly expected spending based on a coarse category of diseases from the prior 12 spell months and the current month of treatment. The four dependent variables as shown from column 1 to column 4 are defined as follows: log(real payments for procedures| > 0) = log of actual payments deflated by Medicare's Geographic Price Cost Index (practice costs) and year; log(pricing intensity) = log(spending using actual prices/spending using US average prices); log(treatment intensity) = log(spending using US average prices/expected spending | concurrent RRS); log(coding intensity) = log((expected spending | concurrent RRS)/(expected spending |prior period RRS and coarse concurrent diagnoses)). (For Medicare's Graphic Price Cost Index, see www.dol.gov/owcp/regs/feeschedule/fee/fee11/fs11 gpci by msa-zip.xls.) All regressions control for employee county and individual fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the level of employer-year-family or individual coverage type using a three-step algorithm described in detail in Section IV of the text. a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.10.
higher prices, and consumers among CDHDs face statistically 11.0 percent higher prices (p = 0.03) than in PPOs. In addition, none of the plan types show statistically significant effects on treatment intensity. The final column in Table 4 shows that all of the plan types code patients more intensively than PPOs (although the difference is not statistically significant for POS plans). Overall, about 15 percent (36 percent, 34 percent) of the 11.4 percent (12.2 percent, 12.2 percent) increase in procedure-related payments among HMOs (COMPs, CDHDs) relative to PPOs is contributed by differences in coding intensities.
Finally, we estimate the overall health plan type effects on health-care spending (with a focus on procedure payments) by calculating expected total health spending as the product of visit rate (Pr(visit)) and total spending conditional on receiving care (Y|Y > 0). To do this, we adopt a bootstrap approach that takes into account the empirical correlations between visit decisions and determination of spending conditional on receiving care (for example, consumers who are more likely to visit doctors are likely to pay more conditional on receiving care). Specifically, we reestimate our full models on 100 random samples of our data drawn at employer-year-family coverage type (EYF) levels and generate confidence intervals from the empirical distribution of the predicted levels of treatment spells and spending in our sample using the sample mean for all PPO enrollees (our base plan type).
30 Table 5 shows the bootstrapped means and 95 percent confidence intervals of probability of visit, procedure payments per spell (conditional and unconditional on a visit), and predicted total savings of each plan type relative to PPOs from our two-part models. 31 ,32 Results imply that all three narrow-network plans (EPOs, HMOs, and POS plans) statistically significantly predict a reduced probability of a visit relative to PPOs.
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None of these three plan types achieve lower payments on procedures conditional on patients seeking care. Overall, none of these three plan types is successful in reducing overall health-care expenditures relative to PPOs (final column). The bootstrapped estimates confirm that CDHDs do not differ statistically in their probability of any visit, and also suggest that they have higher spending conditional on a visit spell. 34 Overall, both COMPs and 30 Further details about this method are described in Online Appendix C. 31 In Online Appendix Table A8 , we present results from conducting three different bootstrapping estimates of the results in Table 5 . All of these predictions use the sample means of all control variables for PPO enrollees, and predictions are presented by plan type. The first set of bootstrap estimates uses the EYF clustering from the base case of our analysis, in which we randomly select 100 draws of enrollees by EYF. The second simulation uses random draws of individuals but not EYF clusters, while the third set uses 100 two-stage random sampling of both EYFs and individuals. These simulations show that estimated mean effects are robust to how bootstrapped samples are drawn, and that standard errors are only modestly higher when both EYF and individual-level observation correlations are controlled for. Simulations while only correcting for individual error correlations underestimate standard errors relative to those allowing EYF error correlations. Results using two-stage bootstrapping lead to similar conclusions about statistical significance as those used in our base case as presented here. 32 Unlike previous estimation results, these bootstrapped results reflect an alternative way of calculating standard errors that are robust to clustered errors, and also permit calculations of predicted means in levels using all of the structural parameters in the model. Because bootstrapped estimates are calculated in a different manner, the statistical significance in Table 5 differs from that in the corresponding results in Table 3 , column 1, and Table 4 , column 1. This is both because bootstrapping uses empirical sampling distributions rather than analytical expressions for cluster-robust standard errors, and because the confidence intervals used here are not symmetrical around the point estimate, as they are when using a normal distribution approximation for standard errors. We briefly mention differences in the text and discuss this issue further in Online Appendix C. 33 Note that in Table 3 , EPOs were not statistically significantly different from PPOs in the probability of visit model. 34 Table 4 finds no significant effect of CDHDs on procedure spending. Tables 3  (first column) and 4 (first column). Results shown summarize the means and confidence intervals from estimating both models 100 times on random samples of 108.9 million person spells with 510 employer-year-family coverage type combinations drawn with replacement from the original sample. After first absorbing individual-and county-level fixed effects, for each random sample we reestimate our full 2SLS models, to generate point estimates of the effects of health plan types on the probability of a visit and spending conditional on a visit. Regression results from each sample are then used to predict spending at the sample means of those who actually choose PPO plans. Means for PPOs are calculated from the original sample. The 95% confidence interval corresponds to the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles among the 100 simulated predictions. Estimates for monthly savings (the final two columns) are obtained from the overall predictions in the earlier pair of columns by subtracting the predicted values for PPOs from the other plan predictions. Significance letters show whether plan type predictions are statistically significantly different from the PPO means based on the empirical bootstrapped distributions using two-sided tests: a p < 0.01, b p < 0.05, c p < 0.10.
CDHDs are predicted to increase total monthly spending on procedures relative to PPOs. The point estimate is that spending on procedures is $75 higher for COMPs and $36 higher for CDHDs. These reflect spending on procedures that is 34 percent higher for COMPs and 16 percent higher for CDHDs.
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35 In the Online Appendix, we take a different approach and directly estimate the health plan type effects on both total payments and spending on procedures using the full analysis sample including spell months with zero payments. Results are shown in Online Table A5 . See a description of the alternative methodology used there. According to the table, EPO plans seem to achieve the most cost savings, whereas comprehensive insurance has a consistently higher spending than PPOs. Online Table A5 also shows that total spending that includes facility payments is more sensitive to outliers (e.g., column 3 versus 6) than procedure payments, where top coding does not change the qualitative implications about plan types' relative savings (e.g., column 9 versus 12).
VII. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines variation in health-care utilization and spending for a monthly spell of treatment. Our results confirm the widely held finding that comprehensive insurance plans-which do not manage care, require gatekeepers, or restrict provider choices on the supply side and tend to have minimal cost sharing-have the highest procedure costs, enroll sicker patients, induce a higher probability of seeking care, and have higher costs conditional on making a visit. Narrow networks seem effective in reducing probability of visits, particularly new visits. Similar to all other plan types, narrow-network plan types do not differ meaningfully from PPOs in influencing decisions to seek continuing or chronic care. 36 Using our decomposition framework to explain total spending on procedures, we find no effect of EPOs on prices or treatment intensity, but a statistically significant increase in coding intensity relative to PPOs. In terms of total spending on procedures, EPOs appear to be the lowest-cost plan type, but the difference from PPOs is not statistically significantly different from zero (p = 0.26). Among the limited evidence from previous studies, Gruber and McKnight (2016) examine insurance offerings to Massachusetts state employees, which changed its health insurance. They found an overall 4.2 percent decline in total spending after the state provided incentives for enrolling in limited-network plans. They report a 36 percent decline among enrollees who chose to switch to a limitednetwork plan, but acknowledge that this is a self-selected group. A business study from the McKinsey Center for US Health System Reform (2013) reports even larger premium savings of 21 percent from narrow-relative to broad-panel plans, although they do not mention controlling for selection effects. We do not know of any studies that examine the underlying reasons for cost savings in narrow-panel plans such as EPOs.
Our most surprising result is that CDHDs are associated with 16 percent higher total spending on procedures relative to PPO plans (Table 5 ). The apparent cost savings of CDHDs relative to PPOs from comparing sample means and using OLS disappear once we control for endogenous plan type choice, patient severity of illness, and individual fixed effects, with the last adjustment making the biggest contribution. Note that we model spending that includes both health plan and out-of-pocket payments for procedures. Our decomposition of spending shows that this reflects a combination of no significant effect on rates of visits, 11 percent higher average prices, and 4 percent higher coding intensity conditional on a visit. Since CDHDs do not negotiate prices like PPOs, the plan type that has the greatest market share which may increase its bargaining power, it is not entirely surprising that people in CDHDs face higher prices relative to PPOs. Information available to consumers to enable them to shop around is improving, and may eventually introduce lower prices as market share and experience with CDHD plans grow. The current enthusiasm about CDHD plans saving money may arise because they shift expenses away from employers onto enrollees, and may serve to deter high-risk enrollees. We are not aware of any previous studies of CDHDs that had panel data on 37 employers offering CDHDs, used risk adjustment and individual fixed effects, and controlled for endogenous 36 The only exception is HMO plans that are shown to reduce continuation visits relative to PPOs by 13 percent. plan choice when calculating cost savings. Future studies will hopefully apply similar careful control methods on alternative samples and aggregates of spending to validate or refine our findings.
Previous studies on consumer-driven and high-deductible health plans offer mixed evidence on the effectiveness of these plans in reducing utilization and spending because of selection bias, the short study period, and the modest sample of firms offering these plans.
37 Parente and Feldman (2008) found lower health-care costs for enrollees in CDHPs than in PPOs in initial enrollment years, but CDHPs rose to become the most expensive option in the follow-up year. Some of the most recent studies show evidence of more significant savings from CDHPs (Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner 2010; Fronstin, Sepúlveda, and Roebuck 2013; Haviland et al. 2016). 38 Perhaps the most directly comparable study to ours is one by Haviland et al. (2016) , who, using the same data source as ours, compare the health-care cost of enrollees in firms that first offer CDHPs alongside traditional plans with firms offering only traditional plans. They show that firms offering a CDHP had lower annual spending in the first three years after their offering, but that savings declined over the three-year study period (6.6 percent, 4.3 percent, 3.4 percent). Our study is different from their study in several important ways. First, we use individual data rather than group means for our analysis, which enables us to control for individual characteristics, including both individual fixed effects and risk scores. Second, we examine costs of each plan type relative to PPOs, while Haviland et al. (2016) compare firms offering mixtures of different traditional plan types, including not only PPOs but also HMOs, comprehensive plans, and POS plans. Third, we study only health spending related to procedures, and we do not include drug spending in our analysis.
Our results shed light on the complexity of designing policies to reduce health-care spending through affecting demand-and supply-side incentives in several ways. First, supply-side plan designs such as selective provider contracting may be more effective in containing procedure-related costs than demand-side cost sharing. Second, although policies designed to either limit provider networks or emphasize demand-side cost sharing may be effective in deterring new treatment where decisions are often dominated by patients, these policies are much less effective in influencing longer-term, repeated treatment where providers arguably play a bigger role. Third, because of potential interactions between various components of total spending (as in our decomposition), policies that are narrowly targeted may be counterproductive in reducing total costs if incentives to control one aspect of the spending create compensating effects/incentives in other aspects. For example, we show evidence that narrow-network plans provide incentives to reduce provider 37 Baker et al. (2007) and Buchmueller (2009) summarize earlier studies that lend little support for the claim that consumer-directed health plans save money. 38 Lo Sasso, Shah, and Frogner (2010) study a sample of 76,310 enrollees in 709 firms that switched from offering only traditional plans to offering an HSA-eligible plan exclusively or along with previously offered traditional plans, and compare enrollees who switch to an HSA-eligible plan with non-switchers. Fronstin, Sepúlveda, and Roebuck (2013) study one large firm that switched to offering a CDHP exclusively, replacing a PPO.
contacts, but do so mostly for the less severely ill. Not only would this adverse selection increase average sickness of the remaining patients, it may also create an upcoding incentive for providers in these plans.
Our study is subject to several limitations. By using a continuous enrollee sample, we exclude decedents and individuals of partial-year eligibility. Since we have no information in this data set on death or other reasons why people drop out of the sample, we chose to restrict to a sample of population where nonrandom attrition is less of a concern. This paper studies only adults, excludes children and adults age 65 and over, and uses only age, gender, and diagnostic information for risk adjustment. Pharmacy information, and ideally consumer socioeconomic variables that affect access and information, may also be important. We use "off-the-shelf" risk-adjustment models, but a more general approach would be to broaden the information available and fully recalibrate models that predict each of our diverse outcomes.
Another limitation is that we do not observe premiums, benefit features, or how narrow plan networks are, or more generally measure heterogeneity of plan coverage within a plan type. Since we use employer-year-family coverage plan type choice probabilities of instruments that capture this variation in plan type dummies, we do not believe that this approach introduces bias into our estimates of cost savings at the plan type level. But it does prevent us from measuring separately the cost-saving impact of these specific plan feature dimensions.
A final limitation of our work is that by modeling aggregate spending, we end up aggregating diverse treatment decisions, diseases, and providers. Many other studies also examine the effects of individual, provider, and plan characteristics on aggregates such as total spending, inpatient treatment, and plan choice using even more aggregated approaches than ours, such as annual or county-level spending (Glied 2000) , but big data are making finer-level analyses possible. Examination of disaggregated procedures, disease patterns, and treatment decisions, for which treatment spells are well suited, awaits further research.
